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According to the so-called ‘fiscal theory of the price level’ (FTPL), under a non-Ricardian 
regime the price level has to adjust to fulfil the government's budget constraint. In contrast, 
under a Ricardian regime, government balances adjust in order to preserve government 
solvency. We empirically determine whether a Ricardian or a non-Ricardian regime is more 
plausible for the euro area, following the research strategy of Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba 
(2001). A Vector AutoRegressive (VAR) model for the primary government balance and the 
government debt is estimated for the period 1980q2-2013q4. Our model uses dummy 
interaction terms to account for the breaks due to the introduction of the Euro Convergence 
Criteria (ECC) and the start of the global financial crisis, respectively. No evidence is found in 
favour of either regime for the pre-ECC period. In the post-ECC period, a Ricardian regime is 
more plausible. Some evidence points in the direction of a non-Ricardian regime for the period 
after the start of the financial crisis. 
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For decades, inflation has been treated as being determined solely by monetary policy actions. 
Following Friedman (1970), New-Keynesian models assume that “inflation is always and 
everywhere a monetary phenomenon”, and the price level is determined as the unique value 
that equates money demand and money supply. Consequently, high inflation episodes are being 
countered by contractionary monetary policy while low inflation episodes are being countered 
by expansionary monetary policy. Yet, in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, 
conventional monetary policy seems to be less effective as interest rates are stuck at the zero 
lower bound. This situation has led to a revived interest in alternative theories of price 
determination such as the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (hereafter: FTPL). Important 
theoretical contributions by Woodford (1994, 1995), Leeper (1991), and Sims (1994) show that 
the price level is determined by the government’s present value budget constraint and, thus, 
depends heavily on fiscal policy actions.1  
 
According to Woodford (1995), under a ‘Ricardian regime’ government balances (i.e. 
government revenues minus expenditures) are determined in such a way that the government 
budget constraint automatically holds for any price level. In this case, the price level is 
determined by monetary policy in the same way as traditional monetarist theories describe. 
However, under a ‘non-Ricardian regime’ government balances can follow an arbitrary process 
and the price level adjusts in order to satisfy government solvency. In this case, the equilibrium 
price level is determined as the unique value that equates the real value of the government debt 
to the expected present value of future government balances. 
 
Determining the plausibility of Ricardian versus non-Ricardian regimes is particularly 
important for the euro area as it reveals the ability of the European Central Bank (ECB) to 
achieve price stability by means of monetary policy. According to the FTPL, evidence in favour 
of a non-Ricardian regime means that national fiscal policies drive national price levels. Under 
such circumstances, monetary policy plays a minor role in the determination of prices. Since 
fiscal policy decisions differ within the euro area, as becomes clear from Figure 1, the existence 
of a non-Ricardian fiscal regime will lead to price differences amongst euro area countries. 
Therefore, if fiscal price determination holds, fiscal policy has to play a larger role in achieving 
a stable aggregate price level.  
                                                 






[Insert Figure 1] 
 
Fiscal policy has to play an even greater role in achieving the price stability objective if 
monetary policy authorities are facing a zero lower bound, as is the case since the Global 
Financial Crisis (hereafter: GFC). For example, Sims (2016) argues that if the FTPL holds, for 
expansionary monetary policy to be effective during periods of low inflation or deflation, fiscal 
authorities need to use their interest savings (due to the low interest rate) for fiscal expansions. 
In line with Barro (1979)’s Ricardian equivalence theorem, Sims (2016) further argues that for 
such a fiscal expansion to be effective in increasing aggregate demand and inflation, consumers 
have to know that the resulting primary government deficits are to be financed by future 
inflation, not future taxes or spending cuts. In other words, according to the FTPL fiscal and 
monetary expansions can only be effective at the zero lower bound if combined with a non-
Ricardian fiscal regime. Hence, determining the plausibility of Ricardian versus non-Ricardian 
regimes in the euro area is particularly relevant as it has implications for the effectiveness of 
monetary policy in achieving price stability at the current zero lower bound.  
 
Even though euro area members are required to comply with the Euro Convergence Criteria 
(hereafter: ECC) in order to ensure fiscal discipline, this does not necessarily imply a Ricardian 
regime. Two important requirements of the ECC are that government deficits and debts are not 
allowed to exceed 3% and 60% of GDP, respectively. These rules are of an asymmetric nature 
as they only provide upper bounds for deficit and debt ratios. For a Ricardian regime to be in 
place, government balances need to respond to government debt levels, also in case the ECC 
rules are not binding. A feedback mechanism between government balances and debt is required 
to ensure a Ricardian regime (Creel and Le Bihan, 2006). Furthermore, since the start of the 
GFC, government deficits and debt levels have risen sharply. As a consequence, several 
countries have failed to comply with the 3% and 60% boundaries (Schuknecht, Moutot, Rother 
and Stark, 2011). 
 
In this paper, we empirically examine whether fiscal policy in the euro area follows a Ricardian 
or a non-Ricardian regime. We apply the methodology of Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001), 
who find a Ricardian regime is more plausible for post-war U.S. fiscal data. Specifically, we 




balance and government debt, both proportional to GDP. Some studies have applied this 
methodology to individual euro area countries, but this paper analyses the fiscal regime for the 
euro area as a whole. Examining fiscal regimes at the aggregated level enables us to discuss 
implications for the euro area price level and possible frictions between monetary policy and 
the fiscal regime. We extend the methodology used by Canzoneri et al. by including two dummy 
interaction terms in our VAR model. Verified by statistical break-point tests, the first dummy 
interaction term accounts for the implementation of the ECC fiscal requirements around 1997q3 
and the second accounts for start of the GFC around 2008q3. As a result of the inclusion of the 
two dummy interaction terms, changes in the fiscal regime can be analysed over time. 
 
After having estimated our VAR model, an (unexpected) shock to the government balance is 
imposed and the plausibility of Ricardian and non-Ricardian regimes is evaluated by means of 
impulse response functions. Due to the inclusion of the dummy interaction terms, three periods 
can be distinguished. The first period covers the years before the introduction of the ECC, the 
second is the period between the introduction of the ECC and the start of the GFC, and the third 
covers the post-GFC period. Impulse response functions are analysed for these three periods.  
 
Our results for the first period, i.e. before the introduction of the ECC, are not considered to be 
favourable for either one of the two regimes since the impulse response functions are 
insignificant. For both post-ECC periods, our impulse response functions indicate that debt 
responds negatively to a positive shock to the balance. In order for a non-Ricardian regime to 
be plausible in such a situation, the correlation between the current balance and future balances 
needs to be negative. Yet, autocorrelation coefficients are positive for the period before the start 
of the GFC and, therefore, we conclude that a Ricardian regime is more plausible. For the period 
after the start of the GFC, negative autocorrelation is found after 5 periods, which provides 
some evidence in favour of a non-Ricardian regime.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 presents the 
methodology that we use to examine the plausibility of Ricardian versus non-Ricardian 
regimes. Section 4 discusses the data. Section 5 reports the results. Section 6 provides a 









2. Literature review 
 
This section first summarizes the fiscal theory of the price level and then discusses some of the 
empirical literature on the fiscal theory of the price level.  
 
2.1 The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level 
 
According to traditional monetarist models, the price level is determined as the unique price 
level that equates the purchasing power of the money supply to the real money demand (Fisher, 
1911). This principle forms the basis for many macroeconomic models and analyses such as 
the well-known IS-LM framework. According to these models, the government is able to 
determine the price level by varying the money supply. Yet, the price level might be 
indeterminate in some special cases. In one such case, namely if the money supply itself 
depends on the price level, both the money supply and the price level are indeterminate (Sargent 
and Wallace, 1975).  
 
The FTPL aims at providing a way out of such a situation where the price level is indeterminate. 
According to this theory, put forward mainly by Woodford (1994, 1995), Leeper (1991), and 
Sims (1994), it is not monetary policy but fiscal policy that determines the price level. 
Woodford shows how fiscal policy determines the price level in a simple representative-
household model such as that of Sidrauski (1967) and Brock (1975). The defining feature of 
Woodford's model is the way in which the government's budget constraint is satisfied. In 
equilibrium, the following present value government budget constraint must hold: 
 





𝑠𝑗,            (1) 
 
where wt is the ratio of government debt to nominal GDP at the beginning of period t, st is the 
ratio of the primary government balance to nominal GDP in period t, and αt is the discount 
factor for period t. More details on the derivation can be found in Appendix A.2 Simplified, Eq. 
(1) states the following: 
                                                 
2 The definition of the present value budget constraint used here differs slightly from the one used by Woodford 
(1995) as we chose to follow the empirical strategy used by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001). Whereas 







= Expected present value of primary balances at time t,        (2) 
 
where Wt is the nominal government debt level at the beginning of period t, Pt is the price level 
in period t, and yt is real GDP in period t. Even though monetarist models also acknowledge 
such an equality, the difference between the monetarist view and the FTPL lies in its 
interpretation. Let us analyse both views in turn. 
 
In the monetarist view, Eq. (1) is a constraint and should hold in order for the government to 
be solvent. Primary balances are set in such a way that the equality holds no matter what the 
price level is. The fiscal authority follows a Ricardian regime in this case (Woodford, 1995). 
Eq. (1) plays no role for price determinacy as, instead, the price level is determined in the money 
market. 
 
The FTPL interprets Eq. (1) differently, as the price level will adjust in such a way that the 
equality holds. According to this view, Eq. (1) is merely an equality and the government can 
choose any arbitrary path for its balances. The price level will adjust in such a way that the 
equality always holds and the government remains solvent. If the fiscal authority chooses its 
balances irrespective of Eq. (1) a non-Ricardian regime is in place (Woodford, 1995). Even 
though the FTPL allows for Ricardian regimes, they are regarded as being exceptional since 
they require strict theoretical assumptions (Woodford, 1995). Therefore, finding evidence in 
favour of a non-Ricardian regime is interpreted as evidence in favour of the FTPL.  
 
Different explanations can be given for the price level changes that occur as a result of fiscal 
policy changes in a non-Ricardian regime. For example, Cochrane (2005) views the valuation 
of government debt to be similar to the valuation of private stock. Therefore, its real value is 
determined by the expectations of future balances. If government debt is backed by less future 
balances, households view it as a less valuable investment. Therefore, they chose to hold fewer 
bonds and consume more goods and services, which leads to inflationary pressure. On the other 
hand, Woodford (1995) attributes the price changes to the influence of a real wealth effect. 
More outstanding government bonds means that there are more net private assets available to 
                                                 
and real GDP. Taking this approach allows for price rigidity and immediate adjustments via real GDP as explained 




households. If households know that this higher debt is not backed by higher future taxes, i.e. 
the government is non-Ricardian, their net wealth increases. As a result of this wealth effect, 
households consume more goods and services, which leads to inflationary pressure. Similarly, 
an increase in the government balance induces deflationary pressure. 
 
2.2 Empirical studies on the FTPL 
 
The literature shows that the FTPL and the existence of non-Ricardian regimes have been 
proven difficult to test empirically. At first sight, one might wish to estimate a regression 
equation such as: 
 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑤𝑡 + 𝝆
′𝑿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡,            (3) 
 
where Xt is a vector consisting of a set of other possible determinants of the price level, and εt 
is an error term. Estimates of α1 and α2 will tell how much the price level depends on the 
measures of fiscal policy, i.e. st and wt. In a non-Ricardian regime, a negative estimate for α1 is 
expected since a higher government balance induces a lower price level. Unfortunately, finding 
this negative estimate does not provide convincing evidence for or against a non-Ricardian 
fiscal regime as a negative relationship between the balance and the price level may exist even 
in a Ricardian regime. In this case, the causality will run the other way. In a Ricardian regime, 
if monetary policy induces an increase in the price level, this lowers the real value of 
outstanding government debt. Taking into account the government budget constraint, balances 
can be lower. Therefore, a negative relationship exists between the price level and the balance 
in both a Ricardian and a non-Ricardian regime.  
 
Hence, to determine whether fiscal policy is able to determine the equilibrium price level, one 
needs to focus on fiscal behaviour. According to the FTPL, the fiscal regime determines 
whether the equilibrium price level is determined by monetary or fiscal policy. In the case of a 
Ricardian regime, balances are set in such a way that the present value government budget 
constraint is satisfied. In the case of a non-Ricardian regime, which is assumed by the FTPL, 
balances are able to move in an arbitrary way since the price level adjusts in order to satisfy the 
present value government budget constraint anyway. Therefore, investigating whether balances 
are set in a way that guarantees government solvency may provide evidence in favour of a 




(1) directly, but this approach is heavily criticized by Bohn (1995) as it needs strong 
assumptions on future discount factors. Instead, Bohn (1998) presents another approach that 
estimates a fiscal policy rule such as: 
 
𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑤𝑡 + 𝝆
′𝑿𝒕 + 𝜖𝑡,             (4) 
 
where st and wt, are defined as above, and Xt is a vector consisting of a set of control variables. 
Bohn (2005) demonstrates that a positive α is sufficient to satisfy the present value government 
budget constraint. He finds empirical evidence suggesting that the budget balance responds 
positively to the beginning-of-period debt in the U.S. during the period 1948-1989. 
Consequently, the author concludes that U.S. government debt is sustainable for his sample. 
Bohn's approach has been applied widely. Greiner, Köller and Semmler (2007) estimate a fiscal 
policy rule for four euro area countries and find evidence in favour of debt sustainability in all 
cases. This result has often been interpreted as empirical evidence in favour of a Ricardian 
regime: balances respond to the initial debt level in order for the government to be solvent. 
 
However, Cochrane (1998) points at an ‘observational equivalence’ problem with Bohn’s 
approach, because both regimes may accept Eq. (1) as an equilibrium condition. Therefore, the 
positive relation that Bohn finds is inconclusive evidence for a Ricardian regime. The reasoning 
is as follows. Causality runs in opposite ways for both regimes. In a Ricardian regime, the 
balance responds positively to beginning-of-period debt in order for the government to be 
solvent. Hence, the price level is not affected, as st responds to wt in order for Eq. (1) to hold. 
In a non-Ricardian regime, however, if an increase in st causes the right-hand side of Eq. (1) to 
rise, the price level will decrease so that the left-hand side of Eq. (1) increases as well. 
Therefore, a positive relation between st and wt can also be found in the case of a non-Ricardian 
regime. 
 
Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001; hereafter CCD) try to circumvent the observational 
equivalence problem by choosing a short-run dynamic approach. They analyse the responses 
of balances and debt after an (unexpected) shock to the balance, thereby determining how both 
variables are interrelated. Specifically, CCD test whether a Ricardian or a non-Ricardian regime 
is present in the post-war period for the U.S. by estimating a Vector Autoregression (VAR) 
model. Their model includes two variables: primary government balances and government 




debt plus the monetary base. CCD present the responses of both variables after a shock to the 
balance. Impulse response functions show that the debt ratio decreases for several periods after 
a positive shock to the balance. Ricardian regimes provide an intuitive interpretation of this: if 
government balances unexpectedly increase, debt is paid off. A non-Ricardian interpretation 
for this outcome exists as well, but the authors regard this as less plausible for the following 
reason. For a non-Ricardian regime to hold in this case, the decrease in the debt ratio has to 
result from a decrease in the expected present value of future balances (the right hand side of 
Eq. (1)). This would mean that there has to be a negative correlation between the current balance 
and future balances. The increase in the current balance has to trigger a decrease in future 
balances which in turn lowers the debt ratio in case of a non-Ricardian regime. Since the authors 
do not find this negative correlation, they conclude that a Ricardian regime is more plausible 
for their data. 
 
Semmler and Zhang (2004) perform a VAR analysis similar to CCD for France during the 
period 1967 until 1998 and for Germany for the period 1970 until 1998. In contrast to CCD, 
Semmler and Zhang exclude the monetary base; their endogenous variables are primary balance 
and government debt, both proportional to GDP. Excluding the monetary base excludes the 
possibility of fiscal price determination occurring as a result of monetary phenomena such as 
seigniorage (Sargent and Wallace, 1981). The exclusion of the monetary base fully disentangles 
monetary and fiscal price determination, which is also stressed by Creel and Le Bihan (2006). 
The impulse responses of Semmler and Zhang also indicate that the debt ratio decreases for 
several periods after an increase in the balance. As explained above, this can occur in both a 
Ricardian and a non-Ricardian regime. Contrary to CCD, Semmler and Zhang analyse a debt 
shock in order to differentiate between a Ricardian and a non-Ricardian regime in case debt 
responds negatively to a surplus shock. The impulse responses indicate that the balance 
decreases after a positive shock to the debt ratio. In a Ricardian regime, a positive response of 
the balance is expected after a positive shock to debt. Since the authors do not find this positive 
response, they conclude that a non-Ricardian regime is more plausible for France and Germany. 
Nevertheless, in a non-Ricardian regime no predictions can be made about the response of the 
balance after a debt shock. Therefore, we apply the methodology of CCD and examine the 
correlation structure of balances in case we find a negative response of debt after a positive 










We test the empirical plausibility of Ricardian and non-Ricardian regimes using the approach 
of CCD. Specifically, we estimate a VAR model and analyze the dynamics between 
government debt and the primary balance. This section first explains how to estimate a VAR 
model when there are breaks in the data and then discusses the analytical framework we use to 
determine whether a Ricardian or a non-Ricardian regime is more plausible.  
 
3.1 VAR modelling with breaks 
 
The estimated VAR model includes two variables: the government's primary balance in period 
t, st, and the government debt at the beginning of period t, wt. Both are proportional to GDP. 
More details on the construction of the respective variables and the data that is used will follow 
in Section 4. As will be shown in Section 4, two breaks are present during our sample period, 
the first due to the introduction of the ECC and the second after the start of the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC) in 2008. We use time dummies to address such breaks and estimate a VAR model 
including two dummy interaction terms. Splitting the sample in three sub-periods and 
estimation of three VARs is no option because of the resulting loss of observations. Therefore, 
dummy interaction terms are introduced and the model is estimated for the whole sample 
period. The first dummy interaction term accounts for the implementation of the Euro 
Convergence Criteria (DECC) and the second accounts for the start of the GFC (DGFC). The 
reduced-form model, including p lags, looks as follows:  
 
𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛽𝑠𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐶 + 𝛾𝑠𝐷𝐺𝐹𝐶 + 𝛿𝑠𝑠(𝐿)𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑠𝑤(𝐿) 𝑤𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑠𝑠(𝐿)𝑠𝑡−1𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐶
+ 𝜂𝑠𝑤(𝐿)𝑤𝑡−1𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐶 +  𝜃𝑠𝑠(𝐿)𝑠𝑡−1𝐷𝐺𝐹𝐶 +  𝜃𝑠𝑤(𝐿)𝑤𝑡−1𝐷𝐺𝐹𝐶 +  𝑒𝑡
𝑠                  (5) 
 
𝑤𝑡 = 𝛼𝑤 + 𝛽𝑤𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐶 + 𝛾𝑠𝐷𝐺𝐹𝐶 + 𝛿𝑤𝑠(𝐿)𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑤𝑤(𝐿)𝑤𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑤𝑠(𝐿)𝑠𝑡−1𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐶  
+ 𝜂𝑤𝑤(𝐿)𝑤𝑡−1𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐶 +  𝜃𝑤𝑠(𝐿)𝑠𝑡−1𝐷𝐺𝐹𝐶 + 𝜃𝑤𝑤(𝐿)𝑤𝑡−1𝐷𝐺𝐹𝐶 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑤,              (6) 
 
where 𝛿𝑖𝑗(𝐿) = 𝛿1.𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿2.𝑖𝑗𝐿 + ⋯ + 𝛿𝑝.𝑖𝑗𝐿
𝑝−1 for i,j = s, w, and 𝜂𝑖𝑗(𝐿) and 𝜃𝑖𝑗(𝐿) are similar 
polynomials. In short-hand matrix notation: 
 





Hence, each endogenous variable is explained by a constant, a constant interacted with both 
dummy variables, lagged values for both endogenous variables, lagged values interacted with 
both dummy variables, and an error term. The error term is assumed to be serially and mutually 
uncorrelated. Eq. (7) can be estimated by means of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), since both 
equations contain the same set of lagged variables. The inclusion of the dummy variables as 
exogenous variables enables us to determine whether the constant in the regression equations 
changes after the breaks. Moreover, the dummy interaction terms are added as endogenous 
variables in order to determine whether the slopes of the regression equations change after the 
occurrence of the breaks. 
 
After estimating the above VAR model, three VAR models are created from the estimated 
coefficients. Each of the three separate models represents a different period. When both dummy 
terms are equal to zero, i.e. when considering the first period, the estimated VAR is equal to a 
simple bivariate VAR model. The coefficients for the dummy interaction terms are neglected. 
When considering the second period, the estimated coefficients of the VAR model are found 
by adding the respective coefficients of the endogenous variables to the estimated coefficients 
of the first dummy interaction term. For example, the constant in the estimated equation for st 
is found by adding the estimates for αs and βs. Similarly, the estimated coefficients for the VAR 
of the last period are found by adding the respective coefficients of the second dummy 
interaction coefficients. For example, the constant in the estimated equation for st is found by 
adding the estimates for αs, βs and γs. 
 
The IRFs are calculated by imposing a recursive ordering as in Sims (1980). The primary 
balance is ordered before debt. In other words, the balance affects debt contemporaneously. In 
order to obtain standard errors for the estimated coefficients and confidence intervals for the 
IRFs of the VAR model including the dummy interaction terms, the bootstrap methodology of 
Runkle (2002) is used. This methodology is a parametric bootstrap method that is suitable for 
time series data since it preserves the temporal dependence of the data in generating bootstrap 
samples.3 The method proceeds as follows: 
 
                                                 
3 The original bootstrap methodology of Efron (1982) cannot be used as this assumes that all observations in the 




1. Estimate the reduced-form model in Eq. (7) using OLS. This gives the estimates: 𝛼 ̂, ?̂?, 𝛾 
𝛿(𝐿)̂, 𝜂(𝐿)̂, 𝜃(𝐿)̂ and 𝑒?̂?. 
 
2. Using the estimated coefficients and residuals of the fitted model, estimate the linear 
predictions for the endogenous variables. Using the reduced-form model specified above, 
the linear predictions are calculated as: 𝑍?̂? = ?̂? + ?̂?𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐶 + 𝛾𝐷𝐺𝐹𝐶 + 𝛿(𝐿)̂𝑍𝑡−1 +
𝜂(𝐿)̂𝑍𝑡−1𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐶 + 𝜃(𝐿)̂𝑍𝑡−1𝐷𝐺𝐹𝐶  for t = (1+p), …, N, where p is the number of lags and N 
is the total number of observations. 
 
3. Using the linear predictions 𝑍?̂?, create bootstrapped time-series, 𝑍𝑡
∗, for t = (1+p), …, N, as 
follows: 𝑍𝑡
∗ = 𝑍?̂? + 𝑒𝑡
∗, where 𝑒𝑡
∗ is a random draw from the empirical distribution of the 
residuals. 
 




5. Compute impulse response functions for both endogenous variables using the coefficients 
given by the estimated VAR of the bootstrapped series of step 4. 
 
6. Repeat steps 3-5 for a fixed number of times. The number of iterations we used is 1,000.  
 
Confidence bands are obtained by taking the 5th and the 95th percentile impulse responses. 
 
3.2 Analytical framework 
 
To investigate whether a Ricardian regime or a non-Ricardian regime is more plausible, we 
analyse the effects of a one-period increase in st. Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) show how 
the balance and debt ratio respond in the current period and future periods. Figure 2 summarizes 
our analytical framework, which is adopted from CCD.  
 
[Insert Figure 2] 
 
In a Ricardian regime, a negative response of wt+1 should always follow a positive shock in st 




non-Ricardian regime is slightly more difficult to identify. The response of the debt ratio in a 
non-Ricardian regime depends on the possible correlation between the current balance and 
future balances. First, consider the case of a non-Ricardian regime and no correlation between 
the current balance and future balances. In such a case, an innovation in st will lead to a zero 
change in wt+1 for the following reasons. In period t, the increase in st leads to a one-by-one 
increase in wt through a decrease in the price level as a result of one of the mechanisms 
explained in Section 2. In the next period, the increase in st pays off debt by the same amount. 
Therefore, wt+1 is unaffected by an increase in st.  
 
Next, consider the case of a non-Ricardian regime and positive correlation between the current 
balance and future balances. In this case, a positive response of wt+1 will follow after a positive 
shock in st. The innovation in st leads to a higher expected present value of future balances as a 
result of the positive correlation. Even though the shock in st pays off part of the debt in period 
wt+1, the increased present value of future balances leads to a decrease in the price level. 
Consequently, wt and wt+1 are expected to respond positively to an increase in st.  
 
Last, consider the case of a non-Ricardian regime and negative correlation between the current 
balance and future balances. In such a case, a negative response of wt+1 will occur after a positive 
shock in st since the shock leads to a lower expected present value of future balances. The 
decrease in the expected present value of future balances will lower wt through an immediate 
increase in the price level. In addition, the higher balance pays off part of the debt which leads 
to a lower wt+1 as well. Thus, an observed negative response of wt+1 may be evidence in favour 
of a Ricardian regime or a non-Ricardian regime depending on the correlation between the 
current balance and future balances.  
 
In order to identify whether a Ricardian or a non-Ricardian regime is more plausible in case of 
a negative response of wt+1, we will follow CCD and analyse autocorrelation coefficients 
between the current balance and future balances. In a non-Ricardian regime, a negative response 
of wt+1 can only occur if there is a negative correlation between the current balance and future 
balances. On the other hand, a negative response of wt+1 together with a positive correlation 
between the current balance and future balances is interpreted as evidence in favour of a 





Thus, if a positive shock to the balance is followed by a negative response of debt, and the 
autocorrelation of balances is positive (negative), the regime is Ricardian (non-Ricardian). If a 
positive shock to the balance is followed by a positive response of debt, and autocorrelation of 
balances is positive, the regime is non-Ricardian. If a positive shock to the balance is followed 






To analyse the plausibility of Ricardian versus non-Ricardian fiscal regimes at the euro area 
level, we use the Area Wide Model (AWM) fiscal database of the ECB, which is compiled by 
Paredes, Pedregal and Perez (2014). The dataset includes seasonally adjusted data on the levels 
of general government revenues, expenditures, and debt for the euro area-18 aggregate.4 The 
time period that is available is 1980q2-2013q4. 
 
In order to construct the primary balance variable, net interest payable should be added to the 
total government balance. However, the AWM fiscal database only includes data on interest 
payable and not on interest receivable. Data on interest receivable and interest payable can be 
obtained from the Eurostat Government Finance Statistics database, albeit for a shorter time 
span. The seasonally adjusted series (using Census X13) are exhibited in Figure 3. Net interest 
payable and interest payable follow roughly the same pattern for the euro area-18. In addition, 
the fraction of interest receivable in the net interest calculation is fairly small. Therefore, interest 
receivable is considered to be zero and the interest payable from the AWM database is 
interpreted as being net interest payable. Thus, primary balances are calculated as net borrowing 
or lending plus interest payable. 
 
[Insert Figure 3] 
 
Nominal GDP is also obtained from the AWM database, that is, from the non-fiscal counterpart 
compiled by the ECB. It is inferred from real GDP and the GDP deflator, since the AWM 
database does not give the nominal GDP as such. 
                                                 
4 The euro area-18 consists of: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 





From the data on the primary balance, government debt and nominal GDP, we calculate the 
balance and debt ratios. Figure 4 shows the time series for the euro area. Descriptive statistics 
for the two variables are given in Table 1. Two significant structural breaks seem to be present 
when examining Figure 4. The first one occurs around the implementation of the ECC fiscal 
requirements in the third quarter of 1997 and is depicted by the first vertical line. The ECC 
enforced rules on the fiscal policies of euro area countries which led to a sharp increase in 
primary balances. The second structural break occurs around 2008q3 and is depicted by the 
second vertical line. It corresponds to the start of the GFC, which caused primary deficits and 
government debts to increase sharply.  
 
[Insert Figure 4] 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
A Chow (1960) structural break test points out that structural breaks indeed occur in 1997q3 
and 2008q3. The F-statistics in Table 2 show that for both series the structural breaks are 
statistically significant at a 1% significance level. 
 
 [Insert Table 2] 
 
Based on the results of the Chow break tests, two dummy variables are constructed, one for the 
introduction of the ECC (DECC) and one for the recent financial crisis (DGFC). DECC is 
constructed to equal 0 for periods before 1997q3 and to equal 1 for periods after 1997q3. DGFC 





Estimation of the VAR model described in Section 3.1 for the euro area aggregate gives the 
estimated parameters presented in Table 3. Two lags are included in the VAR as suggested by 
several lag length criteria.5 An eigenvalue stability test shows that all eigenvalues lie within the 
unit circle which indicates that the estimated VAR is stable.  
                                                 
5 To determine the appropriate lag length, the following information criteria are analysed: the likelihood ratio (LR), 





[Insert Table 3] 
 
The estimated coefficients are obtained by first estimating a VAR model including the dummy 
interaction terms as endogenous variables for the whole sample period. Estimation by OLS 
gives us estimates for the constant terms, for the parameters of the endogenous variables and 
for the parameters of the dummy interaction terms.  
 
The inclusion of the two dummy interaction terms allows us to distinguish three periods. The 
period for which DECC=DGFC=0 corresponds to the period before the implementation of the 
ECC and before the start of the GFC, and it will be referred to as the pre-ECC period. The 
period for which DECC=1 and DGFC=0 corresponds to the period after the implementation of the 
ECC but before the start of the GFC. It will be referred to as the post-ECC period. The period 
for which DECC=DGFC=1 corresponds to the period after the implementation of the ECC and 
after the start of the GFC, and it will be referred to as the post-GFC period. The three distinct 
VAR models are constructed by adding the coefficients of the endogenous variables to the 
estimated coefficients of the respective dummy interaction terms, as explained in Section 3.  
 
Comparing the estimated VAR models for the three periods shows that the signs of the 
estimated coefficients are generally the same while their magnitudes may differ across the three 
periods. A difference exists between the estimated coefficients of the debt equations which may 
lead to differences in the IRFs. As the estimated response of debt deserves most interest in our 
analytical framework, these differences in the estimated coefficients suggest that contrasting 
conclusions may arise across the three periods. 
 
The IRFs are calculated for the three distinct VAR models. Different conclusions are drawn for 
each period as is discussed below. In constructing the IRFs, the primary balance is ordered first. 
We examine the robustness of the results by using different specifications of the VAR models.6 
The results are robust to the exclusion of the constant term, the inclusion of a time trend and 
the inclusion of 1 lag instead of 2 lags. Furthermore, the VARs are also estimated by specifying 
both variables in first differences. Alternative IRFs are calculated by using the reverse ordering 
                                                 
(HQIC), and Schwarz's Bayesian information criterion (SBIC). All information criteria suggest that including two 
lags is optimal for our VAR estimation. 




of the variables. For the latter two specifications the results are qualitatively the same; however, 





The period of our first VAR model corresponds to the pre-ECC period. During this period 
government balances have generally increased in the euro area in order to comply with the fiscal 
requirements of the ECC. This is also shown in Figure 4 where balances increase sharply around 
1997q3, the quarter in which the fiscal requirements were introduced. At the same time, the 
debt ratio decreases. As a result a Ricardian regime is expected to be more applicable for this 
period.  
 
Figure 5 shows the IRFs of both variables after a positive shock to the balance in the pre-ECC 
period. As can be seen, the estimated response of debt does not significantly differ from zero. 
Referring to our analytical framework, presented in Figure 2, a zero response of debt after a 
positive shock to the balance can be seen as evidence in favour of a non-Ricardian regime. 
However, this is only the case if correlation between the current balance and future balances is 
also zero.  
 
[Insert Figure 5] 
 
Therefore, to determine whether a Ricardian or a non-Ricardian regime is more plausible given 
the negative response of debt, an analysis of the correlation structure of balances is needed. 
Autocorrelation coefficients of balances for the three distinct periods are given in Table 4. For 
the pre-ECC period, autocorrelation coefficients are positive and significant for at least 15 
periods. Therefore, our results are not considered to be favourable for either of the two regimes.  
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
5.2 Post-ECC until GFC 
 
Figure 6 shows the IRFs of both variables after a positive shock to the balance in the post-ECC 




in Figure 2, a negative response of debt can occur in both a Ricardian and a non-Ricardian 
regime. Therefore, in order to examine which fiscal regime is more plausible, correlation 
coefficients between the current balance and future balances need to be analysed.  
 
[Insert Figure 6] 
 
Autocorrelation coefficients of balances for the post-ECC period are given in Table 4. For this 
period, autocorrelation coefficients are positive for the first nine lags but after the tenth lag 
autocorrelation coefficients turn negative, meaning that a positive balance in the current period 
is negatively correlated to the balance ten quarters later. As explained above, a non-Ricardian 
regime is plausible when the response of debt is negative and correlation between the current 
balance and future balances is negative.  
 
However, we still consider a Ricardian regime more plausible. For later periods, the 
autocorrelation coefficients become smaller in absolute value. As a result, the change in present 
value of balances due to the positive shock to the balance is still expected to be positive. If the 
present value change in balance is positive, in a non-Ricardian regime, a positive response of 
debt is expected, which we do not find. Therefore, we conclude that a Ricardian regime is more 
plausible for the post-ECC period.  
 
In addition, the IRFs show that according to our estimated model, a positive response of the 
balance is expected after a positive shock to the balance. This can be seen as additional evidence 





At the start of the GFC around the third quarter of 2008, deficits increased sharply in the euro 
area. This structural break is clearly present in Figure 4 for both variables. During this period 
government balances (or rather deficits) were not necessarily determined by the debt ratio but 
rather by large shocks caused by the financial crisis. As a result, a non-Ricardian regime is 





Figure 7 shows the IRFs of both variables for the post-GFC period. Again, after a positive shock 
to the balance, the immediate response of debt is negative. However, the response quickly turns 
insignificant. As listed in Figure 2, a negative response of debt can occur in both a Ricardian 
and a non-Ricardian regime. The correlation structure of balances needs to be analysed, in order 
to determine which regime is more plausible.  
 
[Insert Figure 7] 
 
Autocorrelation coefficients of balances for the post-GFC period are given in Table 4 and are 
positive until 5 lags. Thereafter, the autocorrelation coefficients turn negative. Since most 
coefficients are negative, a decrease in the expected present value of balances after a positive 
shock to the balance is more likely for this period. Consequently, given our analytical 
framework in Figure 2, the evidence points in the direction of a non-Ricardian regime in the 
post-GFC period.  
 
However, the fact that only a short period is available to calculate the autocorrelations for the 
last period makes it hard to derive firm conclusions. Autocorrelation coefficients are given for 
15 lags and for the last lags available, autocorrelation coefficients tend to become lower in 
absolute value. Consequently, whether a decrease in the present value of balances is expected 
depends on subjective judgement.  
 
Moreover, the estimated response of the balance after a positive shock to the balance in Figure 
7 is positive and significant up to 6 periods. Therefore, the estimated response of the balance 
presents contrasting evidence for the negative correlation structure of balances found in Table 
4. As a result, we are not able to conclude with certainty whether a Ricardian or a non-Ricardian 
regime is more plausible for the post-GFC period. Nevertheless, the initial negative and 
significant response of debt in Figure 7 combined with the negative autocorrelation coefficients 





Evidence in favor of non-Ricardian regimes indirectly indicates the existence of fiscal price 




government is to remain solvent, prices need to adjust. Therefore, the presence of non-Ricardian 
regimes has important implications for monetary policy as the central bank has less power in 
determining the price level in this case. Fiscal price determination becomes more likely and 
fiscal authorities need to play a bigger role in price stabilization. Due to the effective lower 
bound problem that the ECB is currently facing, the FTPL gained a renewed interest as it 
provides an alternative theory of price determination. If fiscal policy is the nominal anchor in 
determining the price level, the intended effects of monetary policy may not be realized as they 
are countered by the effects of fiscal policies on the price level.  
  
The plausibility of Ricardian versus non-Ricardian regimes differs for the three periods that we 
analyze. For the pre-ECC period the response of debt is insignificant. Therefore, we cannot 
consider one regime more plausible over the other. For the post-ECC period until the GFC, we 
find a Ricardian regime to be more plausible. After a shock to the balance, the debt ratio 
decreases. Given the positive autocorrelation coefficients it is unlikely that an increase in 
nominal GDP causes the debt ratio to decrease. It is more likely that after the positive shock to 
the balance, part of the nominal government debt is paid off. Therefore, we consider this 
negative response as evidence in favor of a Ricardian regime and price determination seems to 
be a monetary phenomenon during this period. In other words, monetary policy is the nominal 
anchor in stabilizing the euro area price level and fiscal authorities respond in a Ricardian 
manner in order to remain solvent.  
 
For the period after the start of the GFC we find some evidence indicating a non-Ricardian 
regime. This evidence mainly results from the negative autocorrelation coefficients of the 
balance. That is, if the government unexpectedly has a higher balance in the current period, 
future balances will tend to decrease. In a Ricardian regime, nominal GDP is not affected by 
this. An unexpectedly higher balance pays off part of nominal government debt which causes 
the decrease in the debt ratio. In a non-Ricardian regime however nominal GDP is affected by 
an unexpected increase in the balance since the negative autocorrelation lowers the present 
value of future balances. Therefore, in a non-Ricardian regime, the decrease in the debt ratio 
mainly results from an increase in nominal GDP. Given our IRFs and the negative 
autocorrelation coefficients, a non-Ricardian regime is plausible. Nevertheless, our results do 
not unambiguously indicate a non-Ricardian regime. It still depends on subjective judgement 




negative response of the debt ratio, a non-Ricardian regime can only be plausible if this decrease 
in the present value occurs.  
 
In summary, our modeling results only give conclusive and unambiguous evidence of a 
Ricardian fiscal policy for the sub-period starting with the introduction of the euro convergence 
criteria (ECC) and ending with the global financial crisis (GFC). This outcome is plausible, as 
during the early years of EMU, countries did make strong efforts to fulfill the ECC needed for 
membership of the currency union. The ECC prompted participating countries to aim at fiscal 
solvency by reducing deficits and reaching sustainable debt levels. Thus, the EMU during this 
episode worked as it should to promote fiscal solvency. Unfortunately, the GFC strongly 
shocked the banking sector in most euro area countries which forced governments to bail out 
large and systemically important banks, and led to a severe recession. The GFC led to higher 
deficits and debt. Consequently, for the period since the GFC, we find no conclusive evidence 
of Ricardian fiscal policy.  
 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, the plausibility of Ricardian versus non-Ricardian regimes is investigated for the 
euro area. According to the FTPL it is fiscal policy that acts as a nominal anchor in determining 
the aggregate price level. If a government sets its balances in an arbitrary way, the price level 
adjusts in order to guarantee government solvency. Such a fiscal regime is called a non-
Ricardian regime as in Woodford (1995). On the other hand, a fiscal regime where the 
government sets its balances in such a way as to guarantee government solvency, is called a 
Ricardian regime.  
 
To investigate whether a Ricardian or a non-Ricardian regime is more plausible for the euro 
area, we estimate a VAR model, following Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001). The model 
includes the variables primary government balance and government debt. We extend the 
methodology used by CCD by including two dummy interaction terms in our VAR model that 
account for the two structural breaks that are present in the period to be analysed. The first 
dummy interaction term accounts for the introduction of the ECC and the second dummy 





The impulse response functions for the pre-ECC period do not point towards either of the two 
regimes. For this period, the response of debt after a positive shock to the balance is not 
significantly different from zero. This can be evidence in favour of a non-Ricardian regime if 
the current balance and future balances are not correlated. Since we do not find this zero 
correlation, our results are not considered to be favourable for either of the two regimes. 
 
For the period between the introduction of the ECC and the start of the GFC we find a negative 
response of debt after a positive shock to the balance. This negative response can be evidence 
in favour of both a Ricardian and a non-Ricardian regime. However, in a non-Ricardian regime, 
the negative response can only be explained if there exists a negative correlation between the 
current balance and future balances. Since evidence for this cannot be found, a Ricardian regime 
is more plausible for the post-ECC period. Thus, during this episode the EMU worked as it 
should to promote fiscal solvency and monetary policy is the nominal anchor in determining 
the price level.  
  
For the post-GFC period, the debt ratio again responds negatively to an increase in the balance. 
However, in this case we do find some evidence for a negative correlation between the current 
balance and future balances. Whether this negative correlation leads to a decrease in the 
expected present value of balances and, thus, presents evidence in favour of a non-Ricardian 
regime, depends on subjective judgement. Moreover, the IRFs of our estimated model show a 
positive response of the balance after a positive shock to the balance. Therefore, even though 
some evidence exists in favour of a non-Ricardian regime in the period after the start of the 
GFC, it is not conclusive. Yet, the existence of a non-Ricardian regime has important 
implications for the effectiveness of monetary policy as fiscal policy becomes the nominal 
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APPENDIX A. Theoretical model 
 
The determination of the price level according to the FTPL evolves around the way in which 
the present value budget constraint is satisfied. Founders of the FTPL derive theoretical models 
including representative households and general equilibrium conditions (see Woodford (1994, 
1995), Leeper (1991), and Sims (1994)). However, since the defining features of Ricardian and 
non-Ricardian regimes lie in the way the government's budget constraint is satisfied, attention 
is focused on this part of the theoretical models here. 
 
Consider the following government budget constraint in nominal terms at any period j: 
 
Wj = (Tj - Gj) + Wj+1/(1 + rj),                    (A.1) 
 
where Wj is the stock of government debt at the beginning of period j, Tj - Gj is the primary 
government balance during period j, and rj is the nominal interest rate for period j. 
Conventionally, a government's budget constraint also includes the change in the monetary base 
on the right hand side, meaning that the existing level of government debt can be monetized. 
However, for reasons given in Section 4, the monetary base is neglected in the analysis of this 
paper. 
 


















,   (A.2) 
 
where Pj and yj are the price level and the level of real GDP in period j, respectively. Thus, the 
ratio of debt to nominal GDP in period j needs to be equal to the ratio of the balance to nominal 
GDP in period j plus a discount factor times the ratio of debt to nominal GDP in the next period. 
The discount factor equals the ratio of growth in real GDP to the real interest rate. By defining 
wj as the debt-to-GDP ratio, sj as the balance-to-GDP ratio, and αj as the discount factor, Eq. 
(A.2) can be rewritten as: 
 





Following Woodford (1995) and CCD, solving forward yields the present value budget 
constraint in the current period t: 
 





𝑠𝑗.         (A.4) 
 
Thus, the equilibrium condition in Eq. (A.4) states that the debt-to-GDP ratio equals the 
expected present value of all future balance-to-GDP ratios. The derivation of Eq. (A.4) assumes 























Figure 2: Analytical framework Ricardian versus non-Ricardian regime 
 
 
Note: After an (unexpected) positive shock to st, a decrease in wt is expected in a Ricardian regime. In a non-Ricardian 
regime, the response of wt depends on the autocorrelation structure of government balances. In case of zero autocorrelation 
between current and future balances, no response of wt is expected in the period after the shock. In case of positive (negative) 


































































































Figure 3: Interest payable versus net interest payable, i.e. interest payable minus interest 






















Figure 4: Primary government balance (left y-axis) and debt (right y-axis), both proportional to 




Note: the first vertical line indicates the break occurring at the introduction of the ECC. The second vertical line indicates the 































































































Table 1: Descriptive statistics of balance-to-GDP ratio and debt-to-GDP ratio for the euro 
area aggregate (sample period: 1980q2-2013q4) 
 
 Balance/GDP Debt/GDP 
Sample mean -0.002 0.644 
Standard deviation 0.006 0.129 
Minimum -0.013 0.384 
Maximum 0.008 0.922 
Observations 135 135 
 
 
Table 2: F-statistics of a Chow test including both an intercept dummy and a slope dummy 
 DECC DGFC 
Balance/GDP 90.27 177.00 
Debt/GDP 229.49 233.54 
Note: DECC equals 0 for periods before 1997q3 and 1 for periods after 1997q3. DGFC equals 0 
for periods before 2008q3 and 1 for periods after 2008q3. The critical F-value for a 1% 




Table 3: Three distinct VAR models depending on the subsample  
 
 Pre-ECC  Post-ECC Post-GFC 
 





























































       
Number of 
obs. 
133      
Loglikelihood 1276.517      
AIC -18.745      






Table 4: Autocorrelations of balances for the three consecutive periods  
 
 Pre-ECC Post-ECC Post-GFC 
LAG AC Q Prob>Q AC Q Prob>Q AC Q Prob>Q 
1 0.9174 61.48 0.0000 0.9402 41.61 0.0000 0.8126 16.602 0.0000 
2 0.8172 110.98 0.0000 0.8641 77.596 0.0000 0.5665 25.073 0.0000 
3 0.7177 149.72 0.0000 0.7847 107.99 0.0000 0.3557 28.59 0.0000 
4 0.6172 178.81 0.0000 0.6708 130.76 0.0000 0.1774 29.513 0.0000 
5 0.5132 199.24 0.0000 0.5589 146.97 0.0000 0.0099 29.516 0.0000 
6 0.4199 213.12 0.0000 0.4379 157.19 0.0000 -0.1104 29.918 0.0000 
7 0.3313 221.9 0.0000 0.3026 162.2 0.0000 -0.2000 31.327 0.0001 
8 0.2645 227.59 0.0000 0.1696 163.81 0.0000 -0.2825 34.337 0.0000 
9 0.2201 231.59 0.0000 0.0436 163.92 0.0000 -0.2758 37.426 0.0000 
10 0.1949 234.78 0.0000 -0.0743 164.25 0.0000 -0.2622 40.451 0.0000 
11 0.1746 237.38 0.0000 -0.1781 166.2 0.0000 -0.2860 44.378 0.0000 
12 0.1615 239.65 0.0000 -0.2733 170.92 0.0000 -0.2945 48.956 0.0000 
13 0.1554 241.78 0.0000 -0.3530 179.06 0.0000 -0.2747 53.382 0.0000 
14 0.1341 243.4 0.0000 -0.4206 190.99 0.0000 -0.2424 57.261 0.0000 
15 0.1133 244.58 0.0000 -0.4955 208.13 0.0000 -0.2200 60.913 0.0000 
Note: AC refers to the autocorrelation coefficient. . Q refers to a Portmanteau (Q) test statistic that tests against 
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